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In certain countries with currency restrictions, the existence of 
centres, with international backup and the support of institutions in
the country concerned, might make it possible to negotiate with the 
authorities to liberalize xchange controls for scientific journals im- 
ported through the centre. A further stage might be the direct import- 
ing of journals by centres, with even, on occasion, the possibility of 
making bulk air shipments economically viable. This, however, 
should not be an immediate preoccupation. 
Questions 
The following questions are intended to be sent to members of this 
association, to national associations and institutions which are mem- 
bers of the IUAES, and to journals which are not yet members of this 
association. They are designed to elicit information which would give 
a more concrete idea of the possibilities of getting the above system, 
or something like it, in operation: 
1. If a journal editor, would you seek to have your journal co- 
operate with such centres? 
2. Do you think a centre would operate ffectively in your country? 
3. What special problems might arise in your country in operating 
such a centre, and to what extent could these be overcome? 
4. Whom, or what institution, would you suggest o take responsi- 
bility for such a centre in your country, bearing in mind that financial 
and administrative reliability isessential? 
5. Are there other countries which could cooperate with yours in 
running a single centre for the countries cooperatively (e.g., Australia 
and New Zealand? U.S. and Canada? Venezuela nd Colombia?)? 
6. Your name, address, and affiliation: 
Cross-cultural Diflerences inthe Assessment 
and Communication of Uncertainty 
by G. N. WRIGHT and L. D. PHILLIPS 
Decision Analysis Unit, Brune, Institute of Organisation and 
Social Studies and Department of Psychology, Brunel Univer- 
sity, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, England. 3 v 79 
The research reported here investigates East-West differences 
in the way people view uncertainty and assess probabilities or, 
generally, think probabilistically. Our hypothesis was that 
people brought up in "fate-oriented" cultures, in which causa- 
tion is viewed in terms of intuition and context rather than in 
terms of cause-and-effect sequences, will deal with uncertainty 
in ways fundamentally different from our own. 
Wilson (1970) supports the view that Asian culture is, in 
general, fate-oriented: "In most Asian philosophies and reli- 
gions man appears as a part of nature rather than as an antago- 
nist against it.... hence the reservation which many Asians 
feel about the thrusting Western urge to gain control of the 
environment." Similarly: "Astrology is taken very seriously in 
many parts of Asia.... when a foreigner asked President 
Suharto's Western-educated economic advisers whether they 
felt themselves to be competing with the guru, or mystical sage, 
whom he frequently consults on important matters, they 
replied, 'It's easy, Suharto asks us about economics and he asks 
the gurus about the timing.'" 
That East-West differences inprobabilistic thinking exist has 
been established in recent work by Phillips and Wright (1977) 
and Wright et al. (1978). Using college and university students 
from Britain, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Malaysia, we have 
studied three aspects of probabilistic thinking: tendency to 
adopt a probabilistic set, discrimination of uncertainty, and 
realism or "calibration" of assessments of probability. The 
largest difference in probabilistic thinking was between the 
Asians and the British. The British students were found to 
adopt a more finely differentiated view of uncertainty than the 
Asian students in response to uncertain situations. These differ- 
ences were not predictable on the basis of the relative abundance 
of probability expressions in the Indonesian language or the 
Malay sample's ability to discriminate English probability 
words on a meaningful probability-discrimination dimension. 
In assigning numerical probabilities to almanac questions, the 
British students were more realistic than the Asians. Com- 
parable differences between British and Asian expressions of 
uncertainty have been reported by Phillips and Wright (1977) 
using Hong Kong Chinese managers and nurses as subjects. 
Wright et al. conclude: 
At present wo major implications can be drawn from our work; any 
extrapolation fthe technology of decision analysis to Asian cultures 
should be approached with caution-the subjective probabilities 
required as inputs may be meaningless. Secondly, intercultural com- 
munication of uncertainty whether by governments, businessmen or
whoever could lead to misunderstandings about the other party's 
view of an uncertain world. 
They go on to caution, however, that, while the Asian samples 
studied generally show less probabilistic thinking than the 
British sample when using verbal and numeric response modes, 
"it must be remembered that these measures are response modes 
and as such are means of communicating uncertainty rather 
than of dealing with it. Perhaps Asian ways of dealing with 
uncertainty do not involve the verbal or numeric response 
modes studied here." 
Alternatively, Wright and Phillips (n.d.) have suggested that 
probabilistic thinking may be related to "generalized authori- 
tarianism," since the literature on authoritarianism, conserva- 
tism, dogmatism, and intolerance of ambiguity assumes that 
people who are high scorers on scales measuring these concepts 
see the world in "black or white" or, as Souief (1958) concep- 
tualizes it, make extreme judgements or responses. As Bochner 
(1965) notes, the primary characteristics of an individual who is 
intolerant of ambiguity are "premature closure" and "need for 
certainty." An item from Budner's (1962) Tolerance-Intoler- 
ance of Ambiguitv Scale illustrates this; a negative response to 
"people who insist on a yes or no answer just don't know how 
complicated things really are" characterises a person intolerant 
of ambiguity. Frenkel-Brunswik, writing in The Authoritarian 
Personality (Adorno et al. 1950:480) about high F-scale scorers, 
notes that "a simple, firm, often stereotypical cognitive struc- 
ture is required. There is no place for ambivalence or ambigui- 
ties. Every attempt is made to eliminate them... ." Rokeach 
(1960:56) notes that there is "relatively little differentiation 
within the disbelief system" of the high D(dogmatism)-scale 
scoring person. Indeed, Ertel (1972) has developed a measure 
of dogmatism based on the content analysis of publications; 
dogmatic writers are expected to use such quantifiers as "al- 
ways," "never," "nothing but," "completely," `must," etc., 
whereas nondogmatic writers will use such quantifiers as 
"often," "rarely," "greatly," "considerably," "can," etc. 
However, Wright and Phillips (n.d.) found little association 
between these personality/cognitive m asures and probabilistic 
thinking using a sample of the general British population. 
Extending this finding, we should expect no relationship be- 
tween cultural differences in probabilistic thinking and pre- 
vious mappings of mean cultural authoritarianism and dogma- 
tism scores. 
Recently we have extended sampling within Southeast Asia 
and Britain (Wright and Phillips 1979). The cultural differences 
in probabilistic thinking reported above have been found to 
outweigh any influence of subculture, religion, occupation, arts/ 
science orientation, or sex. However, we also present evidence 
against a "cognitive-deficit" hypothesis and argue that there 
are qualitative cultural differences inways of dealing with un- 
certainty. Specifically, we argue that the Asian way of dealing 
with uncertainty may follow a certainty-versus-total-uncer- 
tainty model which we have called "nonprobabilistic thinking," 
whereas the British way follows a certainty-versus-probability 
model which we have labelled "probabilistic thinking." Follow- 
ing the nonprobabilistic model, we argue in a real-life decision- 
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making situation an Asian faced with uncertainty will attempt 
to keep "options open" and remain "flexible" in the face of an 
unpre-dictable future. Redding (1978) and Redding and Martyn- 
Johns (1978) note that such a decision-making strategy may be 
prevalent in Chinese business decision making. 
Our current research is attempting to test the two models of 
decision making in Asia and Britain by using a variety of 
decision-making tasks derived from the decision-theory litera- 
ture. Included in these tasks are measures of set to obtain 
probabilistic information, valuation of probabilistic informa- 
tion, acceptance of the normative axioms of probabilistic 
decision theory, dynamic probability revision, and risk taking. 
In the next year we hope to establish whether or not probabi- 
listic and nonprobabilistic thinking are distinct cognitive styles 
and, further, to test whether these modes of thought are identi- 
fiable with Britain and Asia, respectively. 
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Our Readers Write 
It astonishes me to see that an innocuous comment about the 
history of Africa (CA 20:227-29) is labeled "controversial" and 
"significant." Research in African history along the general 
lines advocated has been going on in Africa for two decades or 
more. On the problems of method, the general (now slightly out 
of date) text has been MacCall's (1964) Africa in Time Perspec- 
tive.' On oral traditions, the more recent findings have been 
incorporated into Vansina (1977,chap. 8; see also Bernardi, 
Poni, and Triulzi 1978). Another volume edited by J. C. Miller 
is now in press. On language, one can look at Language and 
History in Africa (Dalby 1970) as a sample of what was done 
in the 1960s. Readers of CA will presumably be familiar with 
the archaeology. 
Some points in Mulira's contribution are overstated (e.g., 
the oral "experts" everywhere and the accuracy of tradition) or 
show misunderstanding ( enetic ties of languages), but basi- 
cally his points are obvious. Once one goes beyond this level, 
however, difficult questions do arise when these disparate 
sources have to be brought to bear on each other, and there 
are no easy solutions there. 
At this point the precolonial history of Africa has been 
sufficiently explored to allow for the publication of two multi- 
volume series that deal with the topic. One is the Cambridge 
History of Africa, edited by R. Oliver and J. Fage. The other is 
the UNESCO General History of Africa, of which there will 
eventually be eight volumes, six dealing with the precolonial 
period. The first volumes of this latter series should be published 
this year. 
JAN VANSINA 
Department ofHistory, University ofWisconsin-Madison, Madison, 
Wis. 53706, U.S.A. 
Why is the pig such a maligned beast? The descriptions cited in 
the quotations in CA 20:248 seem to be written by urban-born, 
urban-bred men who have never spent any time looking at pigs, 
much less pursuing a basic literature on pig physiology and 
behavior. I raised pigs for a number of years, during which time 
I had an opportunity both to watch pig behavior and to engage 
in pig slaughter. In addition, I have at times read materials on 
pigs. These experiences together suggest that practically all the 
assertions by Harris and Coon are false, basically derived from 
Western stereotypes about pigs, glorified folk images rather 
than either observational or technical knowledge. 
First, the pig is one of the most efficient and economical of all 
farm animals (see Vayda, Leeds, and Smith 1961).2 One of its 
by-products, used even until recently-indeed, until the advent 
of nylon-is pig bristles, from whence came the toothbrushes of 
my childhood as well as other sorts of brushes. Coon says the 
pig "is hard to flay and its skin is not available for use." This is 
simply nonsense. I have flayed pigs. Since there is usually a 
considerable fat layer between the skin and the muscle tissue, 
pigs are fairly easy to flay. Further, any red-blooded American 
who knows football ought to know about the pigskin. Pig skin, 
in fact, makes a very fine leather known as pigskin. Even as to 
usage as a food, the pig is more versatile than most animals: 
pigs' knuckles, pigs' feet, fatback, chitterlings, head cheese, 
pigs' ears, even the tail, as well as all the more usual cuts, fresh, 
salted, and smoked. 
Second, Coon is contradictory. He says keeping pigs is an 
extravagance, then says pigs "can be fed on materials not 
otherwise used"-clearly an economy. This was a central point 
in our argument about the efficiency of pigs in Melanesian sub- 
sistence. In fact, pigs I have known ate everything except citrus 
fruits and banana peels: all garbage, roots, fruits, nuts, etc. I 
have seen them catch snakes and frogs and eat these too. Their 
diet is, in fact, wider than that of dogs or goats, both of which 
we generally conceive to be, in our folk view, practically omniv- 
orous. The pig dentition shows that pigs can manage a very 
wide variety of foods-perhaps wider than the variety humans 
can handle. Has either Harris or Coon examined a pig's teeth? 
Feeding on human leftovers makes them doubly effective from 
a human-subsistence or ecological point of view-as garbage 
disposal and general clean-up systems and as absorbers of com- 
plementary food supplies not competing with human food sup- 
1 References cited are as follows: 
BERNARDI, B., C. PONI, and G. TRIULZI. Editors. 1978. Fonti oralil 
Oral sources/Sources orales. Milan. 
DALBY, D. Editor. 1970. Language and history in Africa. London: 
Frank Cass. 
MACCALL, G. 1964. Africa in time perspective. Boston. 
VANSINA, J. 1977. La tradizione orale. Rome. 
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LEEDS, ANTHONY, and A. P. VAYDA. Editors. 1965. Man, culture, and 
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Washington: American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. 
VAYDA, A. P., ANTHONY LEEDS, and DAVID B. SMITH. 1961. "The 
place of pigs in Melanesian subsistence." Proceedings, 1961 Annual 
Meeting, American Ethnological Society, pp. 69-77. 
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